CA VEA T EMPTOR:
LET THE BORROWER BEWARE OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET
ANDRE K. GRAY*
Homeownership epitomizes for many, the American Dream, one that was
attained by thousands when the homeownership rate peaked in 2005. With
the emergence of the subprime mortgage lending market in the early 1990s,
lending institutions began extending credit to borrowers who otherwise
would be unable to obtain large loans, and as a result, some traditionally
unqualified borrowers obtained and used these loans to purchase a home or
refinance their mortgage. However, this dream became a nightmare for
thousands when they could no longer afford the high subprime interest
rates, forcing them to become delinquent on their payments, lose their
homes due to foreclose, or even file for personal bankruptcy. Although the
subprime mortgage market is risky and can potentially lead to abusive
lending practices and harmful affects on consumers, subprime loans are not
inherently abusive and can offer several benefits. For consumers to reap
those benefits and minimize their risks, they have to make informed
decisions when navigating this market.
To alleviate some of the
consequences consumers face, lenders and brokers must be subject to
reasonable government oversight and accountability.

* Candidate for J.D., 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006,
University of Maryland-College Park. I sincerely appreciate Professors Amy Wax and
Lauren E. Willis of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for their suggestions and
comments, and I am grateful for the editing work of my colleagues on the Journalof Law
and Social Change. I extend special thanks to my Congressman, Gregory W. Meeks (DNY-06), for providing me with an enriching internship in his Washington, D.C. office, an
experience which sparked my interest in this topic, and to my pastor, former
Congressman Floyd H. Flake (D-NY-06), for being a beacon of hope and pioneering
homeownership and economic development initiatives in my community. All errors are
my own.
I use the word informed to mean that consumers actually understand the loan
terms and risks and available loan options, which can be acquired through their own
knowledge, from a lender or broker thoroughly explaining the loan and its expected costs
overtime, or from another knowledgeable source. This enhanced use of the word
informed is juxtaposed with labeling consumers as being informed merely because they
received a wealth of loan documentation and may have signed a statement certifying their
receipt and understanding of the material.
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This Comment surveys the American subprime mortgage lending
market and its affect on consumers. Part I addresses the development of the
subprime mortgage market, the nature of subprime loans, and the reasons
why they pose a high risk to consumers. Part II addresses the consumer
benefits and costs associated with subprime mortgage loans. Part III
discusses how consumers' psychology and behavior facilitates vulnerability
to risks in the subprime market, and Part IV examines which consumer
groups are most vulnerable to those risks. Finally, Part V proposes
consumer and lender-oriented solutions as a means of protecting borrowers
who transact in the subprime mortgage market.
I. NATURE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS

Since the homeownership rate in the United States peaked in 2005,2
new and existing home sales decreased by 18 and 8 percent respectively.
An assortment of mortgage loan options became recently successful in the
prime and subprime markets, and non-standard mortgage products enabled
many consumers, who otherwise would be unable to obtain mortgage loans,
to gain access to credit.' Subprime loans originated in the early 1990s, and
by 2001 they constituted 8.6 percent of all loan originations and 20.1
percent in 2006. 4 Researchers estimate that about five million
households,
5
loan.
subprime
a
have
currently
homeowners,
of
or 7 percent
Two primary causes of the origination of the subprime mortgage
market are the increase in securitization and the elimination of usury law
ceilings. Securitization is process of "pooling ...loans to form securities,
which are subsequently sold in the secondary market." 6 In response to the
2 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIFS OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE

NATION'S HOUSING: 2007, at 15 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 HARVARD STUDY], available
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf.
3 REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD
MORTGAGE
OPTIONS
FOR
Al , AMERICANS
1
(2007),
available
at

http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/mm071 mortgage market behavior.pdf (examining consumer and lender behavior regarding
the changes in the mortgage market, explaining why credit, which was previously
unavailable to certain consumers, was later extended to them, and why many consumers
make unwise choices when selecting a specific mortgage product).
42007 HARVARD STUDY, supra note 2, at 17.
5Id.
6 Heather M. Tashmnan, The Subpritne Lending Industry: An Industry Crisis, 124
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deficiency of funds for residential loans during the Great Depression
period, the federal government created the secondary mortgage market, and
securitized mortgage loans were 23 percent of all outstanding residential
loans in 1984 but increased to 52 percent in 1988. 7 The added capital
lenders often gain by securitizing mortgage loans
allows them to extend
8
credit to borrowers in the form of subprime loans.
The development of the subprime market is also attributed to the
elimination of state usury law ceilings on mortgage interest rates. Usury
laws are a means of state regulation of interest rates, and several states
established a default legal maximum interest rate. 9 When applied to the
mortgage market, usury ceiling laws provided that it was unlawful for
lenders to charge specified high interest rates on mortgage loans. 10 To
protect their financial interest, lenders sought to impose higher rates on
borrowers seeking credit who had little or poor credit history or otherwise
adverse financial circumstances.
Usury laws substantially limited the
extension of high-risk credit to low-income and poor consumers.1
After
the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980,12 which prohibited states from setting usury ceiling
rates on first-lien mortgages, many states removed the interest rate caps on
all other mortgages. 13 Thus, otherwise unqualified consumers gained access
to the mortgage lending market and were able to obtain loans.
In the current mortgage market, subprime loans serve a legitimate
and integral function of providing access to credit to many borrowers with
poor or no credit history or who otherwise do not qualify for standard prime
loans. Regrettably some of these loans are sold or obtained irresponsibly;
BANKING L.J. 407, 410 (2007).
7Id.

9 Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to
Contract,24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 301 (1995).
'('See id.

1 E.g.,

id.; EDWARD

M.

GRAMLICH,

SUBPRIME MORTGAGES:

AMERICA'S

LATEST BOOM AND BUST 16 (2007). (writing as former member of the Board of
Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve about the rapidly evolving mortgage market and
the current increase in home foreclosures).
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 4a, 93a, 216, 216a to 216d, 226 note, 1735f-7a, 1831d (2000): 15
U.S.C. § 1646 (2000).
13GRAMLICH,
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borrowers enter into loans without fully understanding the terms or
overestimate their ability to afford the loan, and coupled with the loan's
unfavorable terms, several lenders engage in abusive lending practices to
prey on unsuspecting borrowers. 14 A study by the Center for Responsible
Lending found that 2.2 million households with subprime loans that were
originated between 1998 and 2006 either lost their home due to foreclosure
or will likely default on their loan within the next several years.15 The
Center predicts that 19.4 percent of all subprime loans originated in the
current market will result in foreclosure. 16
A. Subprime Loans are UnconventionalMortgageProducts
Subprime mortgage loans are an alternative to the standard prime
loans. Consumers with satisfactory credit history and who show a capacity
to repay the loan (i.e., by providing documentation of regular and
sustainable income), thus creating less risk for the lender, normally receive
a prime loan.17 "The term 'subprime' refers to the credit characteristics of
the borrower," not the interest rate at which the loan is offered. 18 Borrowers
14

Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President Bush

Discusses Housing (Dec. 6, 2007), availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007 /12/20071206-9.html.
15 ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING
GROUND: FORFCLOSURES IN THE
HOMEOWN',ERS 11 (2006), availableat

SUBPRIME

MARKET

AND

THEIR

COST

TO

http://w vw.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/FC-paper- 12-19-new-cover-I .pdf

(Showcasing the high foreclosure rates in the recent subprime mortgage market and
found that these high foreclosure rates were far higher than even the worst periods in the
modern prime market).
16 id.

17 Edward M. Gramlich, Former Member of the Bd. of Governors of the U.S.
Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual Housing Policy
Meeting: Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges (May 21, 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 Annual Roundtable Remarks], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040521 /default.htm.
18 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF ]HE FED. RESERVE, EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR

SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2 (2001) [hereinafter FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME
LENDING], available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/2001/20010131 /attachment.pdf
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with subprime loans normally have a deficient credit report, including
delinquent payments and judgments against them, and they may have a
questionable ability to repay the loan, as determined
by such factors as
19
credit scores and regularity of sufficient income.
According to the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, subprime borrowers
usually display a range of the following characteristics (not exhaustive
since criteria may vary among lenders):
(1) two or more 30-day [delinquent payments] in the last 12
months, or one or more 60-day delinquencies in the last 24
months; (2) judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or chargeoffs in the prior 24 months; (3) bankruptcy in the last five
years; (4) relatively high default probability, [typically]
evidenced by a credit bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or
below (depending on the product or collateral posted as
security for the loan); and/or (5) a debt service-to-income
ratio of 50 percent or greater, or otherwise limited ability to
cover family living expenses after deducting total monthly
debt-service requirements from monthly income.
Subprime loans are loans offered to consumers displaying some of
the above characteristics. 2 1 Subprime loans typically have higher interest
rates than prime loans to compensate for the increased credit risk to
borrowers, and since borrowers with loans are more likely to enter into
default, the loans also pose greater risks for lenders.22 For borrowers,
19Id. Since credit scores are used in other lending markets as a somewhat reliable
indicator of a borrower's ability to repay a loan, mortgage lenders factor in the score
along with a consumer's level of existing debt and income when deciding whether to
approve a loan and designate a borrower for a certain type of loan (i.e., prime or
subprime); GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 18-19.
20 Id. at 2-3. FICO scores range from 300 to 850, where higher scores reflect
better credit. Although acceptable or favorable credit criteria varies with specific lenders,
a good credit score is typically above 700, while a score around or below 600 could
indicate poorer credit, leading lenders to charge higher rates or deny a credit application.
For example, based on interest rates as of February 27, 2008, borrowers in a 30-year
fixed-interest mortgage who have a 760-850 FICO score may get a 5.942 percent annual
percentage rate (APR) while those with a score of 620-659 may be at 7.258 percent
interest rate. See generally http://www.myfico.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
21FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING, supra note 18, at 2-3.
22 2004 Annual Roundtable Remarks, supra note 17.
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subprime loans are distinguished from prime loans in that subprime loans
have higher upfront and continuing costs. 23 Costs connected with
originating the mortgage application, like application and appraisal fees are
upfront costs, and continuing costs are those "associated with maintaining
the mortgage such as mortgage insurance payments, principal and interest
payments, late fees, and property taxes." 24 For lenders, the decision to
originate a prime or subprime loan is based on the predicted costs
associated with the probability that a borrower will prepay the loan or
default on the payments, and the likelihood that the market interest rate will
change in a way that disfavors the lender. 25 Lenders are also concerned
about the risk of decreased housing values. Lenders use prepayment
payment penalties as a way to discourage borrowers from paying off the
entire loan before it is due. For example, if interest rates decrease,
borrowers may desire to prepay the balance of their loan while they can do
so at a lower interest rate and avoid paying higher rates later, provided they
have the financial means at the time of the interest rate reduction.
The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) found in its quarterly
National Delinquency Survey that the total delinquency rate as of the third
quarter of 2007 reached a peak since the organization began the study in
1986. 26 From the second to third quarter of 2007, the delinquency rate for
prime loans rose from 2.73 to 3.12 percent and from 14.84 to 16.32 percent
for subprime loans. 27 Thus, lenders or the investors to whom securitized
loans were sold are increasingly facing the costs and burdens associated
with subprime loans since they do not profit when a borrower does not
make his or her interest payments.
23Tashman, supra note 6, at 409.
24

1d.

25Id.
26

Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Delinquencies and Foreclosures

Increase in Latest MBA Nat'l Delinquency Survey (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter MBA
Nat'l Delinquency Survey], available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/58758.htm (Complete survey results are available from the
organization at a cost).
27Id. (reported delinquency rate excludes loans in the process of foreclosure).
Note that current MBA survey results are inherently limited because the organization
tracks loans originated within only a three month period, which means that for example,
loans that originated before or in the third quarter of 2007 that did not actually enter
delinquency but are on the verge of doing so in the fourth quarter of that year will not be
captured in currently reported data. This might lead some to believe that fewer loans are
in danger than what might actually be the case.
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B. Subprime Loans Are Not Inherently Abusive or Predatory
The terms "subprime" and "predatory" lending are frequently and
erroneously used interchangeably to refer to abusive and unscrupulous
lending practices. 28 While subprime loans certainly pose inherent financial
risks, and lenders are susceptible to engaging in predatory practices,
subprime loans are not inherently abusive or predatory but serve an
appropriate function in the market. 29 In fact, the U.S. Treasury Department,
Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) expressly approve of lending practices
tailored to expand consumer access to credit through appropriate and
responsible means.
For example, offering subprime loans that are
reasonably priced, undergo sufficient underwriting, and are administered
properly (i.e., without a lender unduly urging a borrower to obtain the loan
and without any concealment of the loans risks and terms) 31could be
beneficial to both consumers and lenders in the mortgage market.
Yet some subprime lenders engage in predatory or abusive practices.
Lenders engaging in predatory practices purposefully offer loans with
exorbitant interest rates and unfavorable terms that it is highly probable that
32
apractice
borrower
default.
agencies
define
that will
includes
one orFederal
all of the
following
acts:predatory lending as a
making unaffordable loans based on the assets of the
borrower rather than on the borrower's ability to repay an
obligation; inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly
in order to charge high points and fees every time the loan is
refinanced ("loan flipping"); or engaging in fraud or
deception to conceal the true nature of the loan obligation, or
ancillary products, from an unsuspecting or unsophisticated
28 FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING, supra note 18, at 10-11.

9 George G. Kaufman, Credit to the Needy Needn't be Predatory, CHIC. TR1B.,
Aug. 26, 2000, at 23.
30 FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING, supra note 18, at 10-11.
31 id.
32 Kaufman, supra note 29, at 23.
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borrower. 33
Other practices that might be considered predatory are: imposing exorbitant
interest rates and fees that do not reflect the actual credit risk the borrower
poses; longstanding and excessive prepayment penalties that effectively
hinder borrowers from prepaying the loan or refinancing when interest rates
decrease or their credit report improves (so that they can obtain a prime or
more suitable loan); and excessive loan-to-value ratios (the amount of the
loan compared to the value of the property).34
Some lenders structure these subprime loan transactions in a way
that the borrower is at risk of losing one of his or her possessions of
considerable value. 35 For example, some lenders extend loans to borrowers
who they know, or should have known, have "little or no ability to repay
the loan from sources other than the collateral pledged[.] ...[and when the
borrower defaults,] the lender forecloses or otherwise takes possession of
the borrower's property," normally the applicant's home. 36 Other lenders
may use "the threat of foreclosure/repossession to induce duress upon the
borrower" to urge him or her to maintain timely monthly payments and pay
off any associated fees. 37 However, legitimate subprime lenders should
recognize a borrower's underlying credit risk and tailor a loan product to
his or her risk level because the lender, or the investor to whom a
securitized loan was sold, profits when the borrower pays off the loan until
its maturity.
C. Subprime MortgageLoans are Risky for Consumers
Although some consumers can afford and eventually repay their
subprime loans, these loans inherently pose great risks because they often
33FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING, supra note 18,
34Roberto

at 10-11.
G. Quercia et al., The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime

Foreclosures:The Special Case of PrepaymentPenalties and Balloon Payments,

18 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 311,313 (2007), availableat
http://w vw.mi.vt.edu/data/files/hpd%/o2018.2/5.hpd quercia web.pdf.
35See FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING, supra note 18, at 10-11 (Some
"lending practices appear to have been designed to transfer wealth from the borrower to
the lender/loan originator without a commensurate exchange of value.").
36
Id.at 10.
37Id.
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include unfavorable terms such as interest rate adjustments that increase to
an excessive amount, prepayment fees, and other costs. Other risk factors
include: a lender's inadequate underwriting, predatory lending practices,
the unscrupulous behavior of lenders and brokers, lack of lender
accountability, and inadequate oversight of the subprime mortgage market.
1. Terms of a Subprime Loan
The subprime market is intended to serve borrowers with blemished
or no credit history or those preferring to secure relatively low monthly
payments. Therefore these loans typically carry inflated interest rates after
the first few months and payment penalties to protect lenders from the risks
associated with subprime borrowers. Frequently subprime loans have a
"payment shock" impact, beginning with an affordable interest rate that
teases the consumer to think favorably about the loan but later escalates to
an unaffordable price which many borrowers realize they can no longer
afford. 3g Though the type of subprime loan varies with lenders, these loans
generally come in the form of: interest-only loans, which for a specified
period of time defer payment on the loan's principal; low documentation
loans that permit borrowers with inconsistent credit or undocumented
financial resources to submit partial records of their assets and income or
other documentation that may indicate an ability to repay a loan; and
payment option loans that suspend payments of certain interest amounts
and aggregate those deferred payments into the accumulated principal
due. 39 Some lenders offer Alt-A loans which incorporate "some
combination of low documentation, slightly subpar credit scores, and
features such as interest-only or payment options." 40 These Alt-A loans
have terms tailored to borrowers with higher credit scores, and are not as
risky as subprime loans. 41 Alt-A loans represent an increasing proportion
of all loan originations, rising from 2.7 percent in 2001 to 13.4 percent in
2006.42
Yet the most frequently offered subprime loan is the "2/28"
38 SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 15,

at 26.

40

supra note 3, at I n.3.
2007 HARVARD Si UDY, supra note 2, at 17.

41

See id. (Alt-A loans "fall between prime and subprime loans on the risk

39 ESSENE,

spectrum").
42 Id.
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adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM). 43 While the standard prime mortgage
loan has a fixed interest rate for normally 30 years, the interest rate on
ARMs varies over time and usually steadily increases.44 Normally, the loan
starts with an initial low teaser interest rate for the first two years and later
increases by rate adjustments in six- to one-year increments for the next 28
years.45 The 2/28 loans are sometimes termed "exploding ARMs" because
of its serious payment shock
effect on consumers due to often unexpected
46
adjustments.
rate
interest
Vulnerable consumers, normally those with an ineligible credit
history and/or in immediate need of a loan, are at risk because they may be
tempted to obtain a loan because of the initial low teaser rate, but being
47
unaware of, or under-appreciating the fact that it will increase over time.
When risky ARMs are used to buy or refinance a home, the borrower faces
the dilemma of paying increasing monthly payments without actually
increasing equity in his or her property. 48 Furthermore, many 2/28 loans
include prepayment penalty clauses for payments made within the initial
two-year fixed interest rate period or for even paying off the balance before
the loan's maturity date. 49 Nonetheless, borrowers are continuing to take
out ARMs. As of the third quarter of 2007, ARMs increased to constitute
14.5 percent of all outstanding loans in the prime market and 6.8 percent in
the subprime market.50 Hybrid ARMs, which incorporate features of
several loan types, constituted 81 percent of securitized loans in the
43 See id. ("[A]lrnost half of [the] securitized subprime debt originated in 2006

was in '2/28' adjustable-rate loans[.]").
Se id., at 16 ("When the discounts expire, payments on recently originated
adjustable loans will rise not only by the discounted percentage points, but also by any
increase in the indexes to which the loan rates are tied.").
45 SCHLOEMER E AL., supra note 15, at 26.
46

Id. at 5.

47 See GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 17. ("[V]ulnerable and perhaps gullible

borrowers can be tempted by teaser rates, low for two or three years but then much
higher.").
48 SCHLOEMER ET AL.,
49

supra note 15, at 26.

See GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 18 (prepayment penalties are fees borrowers
must pay if they pay off their entire loan before payments are due or if they make
payments in any amount before a lender specified date): ESSENE, supra note 3, at 27
n.72. ("Most 2/28 loans have prepayment penalty clauses that apply to the 2 year fixed
timeframe.").
50 MBA Nat'l Delinquency Survey, supra note 26.
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subprime market as of the second quarter of 2006, an increase from 64
percent in 2002.51 Financial analysts predict that the amount of debt in the
subprime market generated by ARMs in 2007 and 2008 alone could total
$482 billion.5 2
Often subprime loans contain prepayment penalties that impose fees
on borrowers for paying off all or a portion of the loan's balance before it is
due. 53 Research indicates that prepayment penalties are attached to merely
54
two percent of prime mortgages but 80 percent of subprime originations.
These excess costs present cyclical financial constraints, particularly for
low-income borrowers, because those with insufficient funds to maintain
their payments are penalized for not paying on time, and those trying to be
prematurely released from their loan obligation face the difficult choice of
incurring prepayment penalties. Nonetheless borrowers who decide to
retain their subprime loan still face increasing and often unmanageable
interest rate adjustments.
2. Relaxed UnderwritingStandardsfor Lenders
The risks subprime loans impose on borrowers is compounded if
lenders have insufficient underwriting standards, permitting them to issue
loans without adequately considering the borrower's ability to repay the
loan. Underwriting is the procedure lenders use to determine a potential
borrower's credit worthiness and whether a loan should be extended, its
purpose is to help lenders and borrowers avoid undue risk associated with
the loan and prevent borrowers from entering into loans for which they are
financially unsuitable.5 5 It is encouraged as "best practices" that subprime
lenders should employ underwriting standards that examine the effect
significant loan payment increases might have on the borrower's capacity
to repay the loan when it enters amortization, and lenders should advise the
applicant or otherwise make
a decision to approve or decline the loan based
56
assessment.
that
on
in part
51 SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 15, at
52 2007 HARVARD STUDY, supra note

26.

2, at 3.

53 See GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 18.
54 GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 18.
55 FED.

DEPOSIT

INS. CORP.,

CREDIT CARD ACTIVI'IES

MANUAL

(2007),

available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/credit card/ch7.html.
56 Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risk, 71 Fed. Reg.
58609, 58613 (Oct. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Fed. Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages],
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When deciding whether to approve a loan application and originate a
loan with certain terms, lenders should not look solely at a borrower's
credit score but should also factor in the borrower's income, assets, and
outstanding liabilities, especially for applicants that pose a risk due to
insufficient income or excessive existing debt. 57 Yet some lenders
regularly approve applications loans based on a borrower's ability to afford
low initial interest rates though the lender knows the rate or cost of the loan
factoring in other fees will eventually rise substantially, probably to a level
which the applicant could no longer afford. 58
This practice sets
unsuspecting borrowers up for financial crisis if they cannot maintain the
payments. The U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC,
and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) seriously warn lenders
against having relaxed underwriting standards or hiring other companies,
who have different business goals antithetical to59responsible and reasonable
lending practices, to perform their underwriting.
The risks associated with relaxed underwriting standards are
magnified when lenders do not require borrowers to allocate funds to
escrow accounts to cover property taxes and hazard insurance, and permit
6
applicants to submit little or no income documentation to obtain the loan. 0
Unlike the prime market where it is common practice to require escrow
accounts and for lenders to consider these additional costs when
determining whether to extend a loan to an applicant, many borrowers in
the subprime market are led to falsely believe a loan is within their means
because lenders might neither consider these factors when determining the
applicant's suitability nor reveal
true and often increased costs of
1
subsequent interest payments. 6
3. PotentialforPredatoryLending
As discussed above, the availability of high-risk loan products in the
subprime market and consumer demand for loan services despite his or her
available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/Oljan20061800/edocket.access.
gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-8480.pdf.
57

1Id. at 58614.

58 SCHLOEMER ET AL.,

supra note 15, at 26.

59 Fed. Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages, supra note 56, at 58613.
60 SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note
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inadequate credit worthiness facilitates the opportunity for unscrupulous
lenders to engage in predatory lending.62 Predatory mortgage lending
occurs primarily in the subprime market, and lenders typically prey on
senior citizens, low income applicants, and borrowers with substandard
credit. 63 A borrower who becomes a victim of predatory lending normally
pays excessive loan application or settlement fees, higher interest rates
adjustments, or irrational prepayment penalties.6 4
Predatory lending is becoming a common practice, and some lending
institutions are being pursued in civil suits, some of which resulted in
settlements.6 5 Unfortunately, the legitimate subprime market suffers from
such tainted practices, and legislators are working to regulate the mortgage
industry and ensure adequate consumer protections. 66 In addition, while
overt housing and lending discrimination decreased due to the nation's fair
lending and civil rights laws, subtle forms of lending discrimination still
exist. Practices such as providing or failing to provide certain information
about a loan, steering customers towards a subprime loan, and even the
selective showing of housing properties (i.e., one the lender know or should
suspect that the applicant cannot afford but strongly might 67desire to
purchase) can be suspect and are difficult to identify and regulate.
4. Aggressive Lender Behavior

62 See supra Part 1.B (asserting that subprime loans are not inherently predatory).
63 FED. BtURFAU OF INVESTIGATION, U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICF, FINANCIAL CRIMES

22 (2006) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs report2006/publicrpt06.pdf;
SCHLOEMER
ET AL., supra note 15, at 27.
REPORT TO THE PUBLIC

64 FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT, supra note 63, at 22.

65 SCHLOEMER EL AL., supra note 15, at 28; see, e.g., Settlement Agreement and
Order Thereupon, United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., CV-96-6159 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (describing mortgage company's agreement to pay $3 million to settle a complaint
of discriminatory loan prices offered to African-Americans, Latinos, women, and persons
over the age of 55, and the company's agreement to, among other things, develop and use
a system to match applicants according to their risk classification and train mortgage
brokers on fair lending practices and applicable laws).
66 Senator Chris Dodd, Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1I0th Cong.
(March 22, 2007) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Chris Dodd], (transcript
available at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q-node/3 795).
67 GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 24.
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Both legitimate and predatory subprime lenders aggressively solicit
consumers, and although their marketing is permissible provided there are
no misrepresentations or use of otherwise illegal tactics, many unsuspecting
borrowers are induced to enter into such loans without full knowledge of its
terms and implications. Some lenders use direct mailings, television and
signs in neighborhoods, and some inappropriately mask their mailings to
appear as government mailings to obtain the recipient's attention." It is
possible for applicants to be swayed to obtain a subprime when lenders
make the application process seems so simple and market the services to be
available to everyone, even those with poor credit records who were
previously turned down by other companies. With advertising phrases like
"Bad credit, no credit. Call Mortgage Lenders & Co. for quick approval"
and other push-marketing techniques, lenders can induce applicants in
serious need of a loan. Many consumers are exposed to and fall prey to
these risks due to insufficient price awareness, and even those who might
qualify for traditional prime loans might be induced to enter unfavorable
subprime loans because of a lack of knowledge about the mortgage industry
and other available loan options. 69
5. Behavior of "Interested" MortgageBrokers
Included in the debate over who to blame for the negative
consequences of subprime lending are mortgage brokers, many of whom
are unregulated, and allegedly steer prospective borrowers into
unaffordable loans, though lenders finally decide whether to originate the
loan.70 Banks and other lenders hire unregulated brokers to influence
customers to take out their loans. Although many brokers transact in the
standard prime market, the subprime market bears their greatest trail. Some
researchers estimate that while only 25 percent of prime mortgage loan
originations were opened through brokers in 2005, brokers were used in
approximately 60 percent of subprime originations. 71 Since mortgage
68 Ronald

H. Silverman, Toward Curbing Predatory Lending, 122

BANKING L.J.

483, 510 (2005).
69 See ESSENE, supra note 3, at 26, 30.
7o Les Christie, Subprime Blame Game, CNN Money.com.,
littp://noney.cnn.com/galleries/2007/real-estate/0704/gallery.paly
game/index.html
(Last visited Dec. 16, 2007).
71GRAMILICH, supra note 1 1, at 19.
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brokers dominate marketing in the subprime arena, and since the number of
subprime loan originations is increasing, lenders often give brokers
incentives to get applicants to obtain their subprime loans.72 Brokers
interested primarily in their commissions pose a danger to consumers.
On the one hand, the presence of brokers makes it arguably easier
for consumers, especially lower income purchasers and consumers of
color,7 3 to access loans and information about their eligibility because
74
brokers have an incentive to go out and attract prospective borrowers.
Since lower income consumers and some consumers of color are typically
ineligible for prime rates or unknowledgeable about mortgage options, they
are especially solicited by brokers. On the other hand, consumers are often
victimized or otherwise uninformed actors because some brokers use
aggressive sales tactics and tell consumers much about the low initial
interest rates yet understate or completely fail to mention the eventual
rising costs of these loans. 75 Reports indicate that some brokers go as far as
orally promising borrowers that the initial teaser rates, for instance one to
two percent, are permanent despite contrary language in fine print in the
loan agreement. 76
6. Lack ofAccountability & Inadequate Oversight
The lack of accountability for lenders and inadequate oversight of
the subprime market also contributes to the inherent risks borrowers face in
this market. The expansion of the subprime market is due largely in part to
the securitization of mortgage loans. 77 Lenders typically gain more funds
when they securitize private mortgage loans which enable them to extend
credit to applicants who otherwise would be denied a loan. 78 The impact of
securitization is that mortgages are now sold on the market to other
72 ESSENE, supra note 3,

at 29.

73 1 use the term "consumers of color" and "borrowers of color" interchangeably

to refer to a group of races and ethnicities that include American Indians or Alaska
Natives, Asians, Blacks or African-Americans, Native Hawaiians or other Pacific
Islanders, and Hispanic whites.
74 GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 20.
75 Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, Bus. WK., Sept. 11, 2006.
76 Id.
77 Tashman, supra note 6, at 410.
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investors, and the risks associated with a mortgage are dispersed among
many lenders, who provide the capital and thus the incentive to issue more
loans to borrowers, fueling the subprime industry. 79 This risk dispersion
and reduction permits lenders to remove themselves from
some of the
0
direct harmful consequences of subprime mortgage loans. 8
Furthermore, the subprime mortgage industry is lacking adequate
oversight although legislators are taking measures to regulate lender
behavior. 81 Private lenders are not regulated as much as federal and other
public lenders, and many of the existing regulations do not apply to all
risky loan products. 2
For example, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation indicates there is no mandatory fraud reporting regulations for
83
most principal actors (i.e., lenders and brokers) in the mortgage industry.
Regulation in the subprime mortgage market is lighter than in the prime
market. Mortgages in the prime market are issued primarily by banks and
thrifts, which are thoroughly regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, the
FDIC, the Office of the Controller of the Currency (OCC), and the OTS.8 4
These depository institutions are assessed every three years to evaluate the
extent to which each institution assesses a borrower's ability to repay a
loan, any possible lending discrimination, and the institution's lending
records and disclosures under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
of 1975.85 In 2005, the three largest subprime lenders (Ameriquest, H&R
79 ANTHONY DOWNS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CREDIT CRISIS: THE SKY IS

NOT FAIING (2007), available at

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/1 0 mortgage industry downs/1
0 mortgageindustrydowns.pdf.
8o SCIILOEMER ET AL., supra note 15, at 6.
81Statement of Sen. Chris Dodd, supra note 66.
92 DOWNS, supra note 79; SCHLOEMER El AL., supra note 15, at 29.
13

FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT, supra note 59, at 21.

84 GRAMLICII,
85 Id.

supra note 11, at 20.

HMDA requires lending institutions with branches in metropolitan areas to

publicly disclose their lending practices on certain loan originations. The disclosures
include the geographic location, race, sex, and census tract of borrowers and other
characteristics of the mortgage loans lenders originate or buy in a calendar year. Lenders
must also disclose mortgage denial rates and the APR on high-priced loans (loans
containing an APR three percentage points above the rate for a security with the same
maturity as determined by the Treasury Department). Currently, the disclosures under
the Act are the only data available to the public that reports characteristics of individual
borrowers engaging in loan transactions. The disclosures are intended to help the public
and its officials determine if such depository institutions are fulfilling their duty to meet
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Block, and New Century Mortgage Corp.) were all independent institutions,
formed under a state charter and not subject to much regulatory
supervision.96 The 2005 HMDA data reveals that 51 percent of subprime
loans were made by unsupervised mortgage companies, 29 percent by
slightly supervised subsidiaries and affiliates of supervised
lenders, and
87
merely 20 percent by completely supervised lenders.
11. CONSUMER BENEFITS & COSTS OF SUBPRIME LOANS

Subprime loans are intended for and benefit, at least in the shortterm, needy applicants who cannot gain access to credit from the prime
market. The innovative mortgage products emerging from the subprime
industry enable borrowers to gain access to credit to which they might be
otherwise denied. However, due to the risky terms incorporated in
subprime loans, the expansion of subprime lending is associated with
increasing consumer payment delinquency, home foreclosures, and
bankruptcies.8 8 Despite the benefits of subprime loans, researchers predict
that many potential borrowers may delay purchasing or refinancing a home,
regardless of if they have a 9 subprime loan, until the mortgage credit
markets become more certain.8
A. Benefits of Subprime MortgageLending
When lenders exercise fair lending practices and consumers navigate
the market armed with information and understanding about mortgage
options, the subprime mortgage market benefits borrowers. Subprime
applicants are typically low- to moderate-income consumers or those
labeled as high risk borrowers due to their mediocre credit history.
the housing needs of the communities in which they are located, and to assist public
officials enforce the countly's fair lending laws and distribute public sector investments
in a way to stimulate investment in the private sector. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (2000).
86 GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 20.
87

Id. at 20-21.

88

See Press Release, Joint Ctr. for Housing Studies of Harvard Univ., Mortgage

Market Complexity Foils Consumers and Undermines Fair Lending, Harvard Research
Finds (Apr. 26, 2007), availableat
http://x~vw.jchs.harvard.edu/media/understanding mortgage-markets-04-26-07.html.
89 2007

HARVARD STtUDY, supra note 2, at 19.
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According to economists, when the capital markets are efficient, consumers
can make unobstructed decisions regardless of their cash on hand, and the
recent innovation in the subprime market contributed to
giving customers
90
the ability to make purchasing decisions about housing.
The U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and
OTS maintain that responsible subprime mortgage lending grants borrowers
access to credit. 9 1 Subprime lending extends credit to those who would
otherwise be barred from receiving loans to make major purchases such as
a home. In fact, these loans give borrowers the opportunity to create wealth,
assuming they do not become subject to foreclosure or many of the other
significant risk associated with subprime lending. 92 An economist at the
Brookings Institution observes that "[most] households appear to have
benefited from being able to borrow more easily and cheaply," and predicts
that "[e]ven with the current problems [in the mortgage market], many
households will avoid foreclosure." 93 Consumers can use this credit to buy
a home, refinance their mortgage, and finance other purchases. Consumers
with little cash can liquefy the equity gained, if any, in their home to obtain
more fund, yet as mentioned below, these funds may be unavailable if the
borrower's property
value decreased or if he or she became delinquent on
94
the payments.
From 1994 to 2003, the amount of subprime loan originations
95
increased 25 percent per year, and prime market loans rose by 17 percent.
In that same period, the homeownership rate expanded from 64 to over 68
percent. 96 It is estimated that from 1995 to 2004 about 9 million consumers

90Austan Goolsbee, 'Irresponsible' Mortgages Have Opened Doors to Many of
the Excluded,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at C3.
91FED. GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING, supra note 18, at 1.

92 Tashman, supra note 6, at 407.
93 DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, NOTES ON POLICY
RESPONSES TO THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE UNRAVELING 10 (2007), available at

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/09subprimemortgageunravelling
/09useconomics elmendorf.pdf;
but see infra Part I1.B.3 (asserting that subprime lending contributed to an increase in
foreclosure rates).
94 2004 Annual Roundtable Remarks, supra note 17.
95 Id.
96

Id.
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purchased a new home. 97 However, research has yet to reveal whether
subprime
mortgage lending
actually
caused an increased
in
homeownership.
In addition, the subprime market lending arguably opened doors for
many who experienced difficulty obtaining loans, particularly AfricanAmericans and Hispanics."
According to Harvard University's latest
national housing report, homeownership rates increased for all consumers
of color overall (defined as African-Americans, Hispanics, and
Asians/Other in this study), rising from 43.7 percent in 1995 to 51.3 percent
in 2006, and in particular, the percentage of African-Americans owning
homes grew from 42.9 to 48.4; Hispanics experienced a growth from 42 to
49.7 percent. 99 As discussed in greater detail below, various studies reveal
that consumers in predominantly African-American and Hispanic areas are
much more likely to have a subprime loan than borrowers in majority white
areas, and in some neighborhoods the percentage of African-Americans and
Hispanics with subprime loans is 40.7 and 28.6 respectively.10 0
The
confluence of these two observations suggest there might be a correlation
between consumers of color accessing mortgage loans through subprime
lending and the increasing rate at which these groups are purchasing homes.
Subprime lending may also provide consumers with a method of
credit repair. If consumers with such loans regularly satisfy their payments
at or above the minimum amount due and eventually pay off the loan, they
might demonstrate responsible financial management to improve their
credit score so they can later transact in the prime market. Yet this access
to credit comes at a cost, though informed consumers may avoid many of
them.
B. Costs of Subprime Mortgage Lending
While the subprime market expands the pool of borrowers who can
qualify for mortgage loans, consumers who enter this market unaware of
the risks, who know or should know that they are unsuitable for such loans,
or who are induced into the market by unscrupulous lending practices, often
incur unbearable costs such as excessive mortgage debt and increased
97

id.

98 But see infra Part IV (explaining how many borrowers of color are
disproportionately and negatively impacted by subprime mortgage loans).
99 2007 HARVARD STUDY, supra note 2, at 36, Table A-5.
100 See infra Part IV.
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susceptibility to delinquency and foreclosure. Thousands of borrowers
were or might be forced to default and fear foreclosure because they cannot
afford the ARM loan terms, and several major subprime lending institutions
filed for bankruptcy because they are no longer profiting since their
customers are not paying off their loans. 101
1. increase in Mortgage Debt
Home mortgage debt is a major source of debt for homeowners, and
from 2000 to 2006 such debt expanded from 65 to 73 percent of all
household outstanding debt. 102 Moreover, an increasing proportion of
households are consuming much of their income paying off home debt, and
for many, the debt exceeds their personal income. Data from 1995 through
2004 indicates that almost two million more households are spending more
than 40 percent of their income on debt, a percentage increase from 8.5 to
9.3 percent. 10 3 The convergence of these two observations indicates why
subprime loans can be so risky. If borrowers are spending substantial
proportions of their income servicing home debt, they will be shocked to
discover that if they cannot satisfy the loan terms they might face losing
their entire financial investment associated with the purchase, paying
exorbitant loan related fees, and potentially losing their home.
Furthermore, consuming substantial proportions of income on debt
servicing may deprive particularly low-income borrowers of finances
needed for other purposes, like food, childcare, and medical expenses.104
Low- to moderate-income borrowers and consumers of color may be
disproportionately affected since these groups tend to have lower median
incomes than their white counterparts or wealthy borrowers. Borrowers
may also face personal bankruptcy at increasing rates,
particularly those
105
who use their mortgage loan to consolidate other debt.
Interestingly, subprime mortgage loans have two contrasting effects
on personal bankruptcy. On one hand, since the subprime market increases
access to credit, especially for consumers in financial need or those who
would otherwise not qualify for standard loans, consumers in a financial
101Tashman, supra note 6, at 407-408.
102

2007 HARVARD STUDY, supra note 2, at 18-19.

103

Id.

104 Silverman,

supra note 68, at 528.

105 Id. at 529-30.
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crisis might be able to borrow against their home equity to give them extra
cash so that they do not have to declare bankruptcy. 106 It must be noted
however that this benefit might not be realized by some borrowers whose
homes were purchased or refinanced with subprime loans but did not
accumulate much equity because the borrower did not make his or her
monthly mortgage payments. On the other hand, since the costly rates and
fees involved with subprime loans create the potential for borrowers to
consume substantially all of their personal wealth servicing debt, this may
force some to declare bankruptcy. 10 7 Moreover, a caveat to the benefit
scenario is that home equity loans are secured by a lien against the
borrower's home; so if a homeowner borrows against this equity and
cannot repay the loan, he or she is at risk of losing the home to foreclosure.
2. Increase in Payment Delinquency
Economists indicate that when home prices began to decline after
the homeownership rate peaked in 2005, there was an increase in the rate at
which borrower began to default on their subprime loans, though subprime
loans still represented a minority of all mortgage loans. 108 Researchers at
Harvard University purport that subprime loans that were originated in the
current market are at a high risk of eventual default. 109 As of March 2007,
over seven percent of all subprime ARMs originated in 2006 were already
at least 60 days delinquent or in foreclosure within six months from their
origination. 110
The 2007 MBA National Delinquency Survey found that the total
delinquency rate, not including loans in the process of foreclosure, is the
highest since the organization began the study in 1986.111 In the third
quarter of 2007, the delinquency rate on mortgage loans for one-to-fourunit homes rose to 5.59 percent of all outstanding loans.11 2 Consumers
106 DEP'T OF HoUS. AND URBAN DEv. & DFP'T OF TREASURY NAT'I

TASK

FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY MORTGAGE LENDING 31-33

(2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
107 Ild.

108 DOWNNS, supra note 79.
109

2007 HARVARD

STUDY,

supra note 2, at 18.

110 Id.

...
MBA Nat'1 Delinquency Survey,
112 Id.
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with both prime and subprime loans are increasingly defaulting, as the
seasonally adjusted delinquency rate rose from 2.73 to 3.12 percent for
prime loans and from 14.82 to 16.31 percent for subprime loans.' 13 The
rate of serious delinquency (loans 90 days or more delinquent or in the
process of foreclosure) increased from 0.98 to 1.31 percent for prime loans
and 9.27 to 11.38 percent for subprime loans.114 A limitation of the MBA
data is that the organization does not report what percentage of loans will
be or have been delinquent, but only the share of which are delinquent
within a given quarter of the year, thus the even the most recent data
available may not accurately reflect the performance of subprime loans.
While it appears that a majority of consumers with subprime loans do not
become delinquent, the recent data suggest that the effects can be
devastating for consumers who already defaulted or will default.
3. Increase in Home Foreclosures
Foreclosures in the subprime market have a distressing impact not
only on individual households but on the economy as a whole when
homeowners lose this vital financial asset and the social advantages of
homeownership. 11 5 For many households, home equity is the greatest
financial asset. Foreclosure rates are influenced by a variety of factors such
as a borrower's poor credit history and provision of little to no income and
debt documentation in the loan application process, higher loan-to-value
ratios and adjustable interest rates that rise to unbearable amounts, rising
interest rates on the market and the deflating values of homes. 116
Researchers at the Center for Responsible Lending contend that the
2005 housing boom concealed the substantial number of borrowers facing

113Id.

11 4 Id.
115SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 15, at 4; see generally, NAT'L Assoc. OF
REALTORS, SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND STABLE HOUSING (2006),

available at http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/files/05%/o2 OSocial%/o20Benefitso
20oP/o2OStable%20Housing.pdf/$FtLE/05%20Social%20Benefits%20oto/o2OStable%20
Housing.pdf
(discussing benefits such as positive impact ol educational achievement of children in the
household and homeowner's greater probably of being civically involved in the local
community, while acknowledging the existence of third variables that make the causative
link uncertain).
116 Quercia et al.,
supra note 34, at 337.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol11/iss2/2

2007-20081

CA VEAT EMPTOR

difficulty maintaining their subprime loans.11 7 The Center predicts that one
in five of all subprime loans originated in 2005 and 2006 will end in
foreclosure, and borrowers with multiple subprime loans face an even
greater risk.118 In the fourth quarter of 2006, almost 250,000 homes began
to foreclose, 1 19 and it is estimated that after foreclosures deplete
homeowners'
equity, it will cost borrowers overall approximately $164
12 0
billion.
During the third quarter of 2006, the foreclosure rates for both prime
and subprime loans increased. 12 1 The majority of consumers borrowed the
standard prime fixed loans which represented 63.1 percent of all loan
originations and 17.6 percent of initiated foreclosure proceedings; 14.5
percent of all loans were prime ARMs of which 18.7 percent began to enter
foreclosure.12 2 Subprime fixed loans constituted 6.3 percent of all loans and
just 12 percent of all foreclosures started; and alarmingly, while subprime
ARMs represented only 6.8 percent of all loans, they were 43 percent of all
foreclosures started in the third quarter of 2006.123
Foreclosure rates are also associated with the presence and duration
of prepayment penalties provisions in a mortgage loan. Some research
indicates that borrowers are more likely to lose their home to foreclosure if
their loan contains longer prepayment penalties (three or more years; 23.6
percent of foreclosures) than loans where such penalty is absent (15.3
percent of foreclosures). 124 The foreclosure rates on loans with prepayment
penalties lasting less than three years (19.9 percent of foreclosures) are 30
percent higher than loans without such penalties.125 However, it is unclear
117 SCHLOEMER ET AL.,

supra note 15, at 3.

118 Id. at 3-4.
119 2007 HARVARD STUDY, supra note 2, at 18.
120 SCHIOEMER FT Al., supra note 15, at 15.
121 MBA Nat'l Delinquency Survey, supra note 26. Note as previously

mentioned, that here the MBA data reflects only those foreclosures that occurred during
a specific three month period, not those that foreclosed before or might foreclose after
this period.
122 Id.

123 Id.: see also Quercia et al., supra note 34, at 333 (suggesting ARMs have
about a 25 percent greater risk of foreclosure than fixed-rate mortgages).
124 Quercia et al., supra note 34, at 333-34 (data sampled from 30-year
refinanced subprime loans originated in 1999; foreclosure rates reflect properties that
were in foreclosure proceedings at least once).
125 Id.
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in which direction the causation runs. It could be that the presence and
impact of prepayment penalties imposes extra costs in addition to the
inherent risks of subprime loans, which in turns increases the likelihood
that borrowers may lose their homes to foreclosure because they cannot
afford the payments. Conversely, consumers who lack bargaining power,
especially those who are uninformed and tend to be more vulnerable, may
be more likely to seek or obtain subprime loans, which have a greater
probability of containing prepayment penalties, and due to their limited
understanding or vulnerability, they may be more likely make a home
purchase and take out a loan beyond their means, eventually leading to a
great risk of foreclosure.
Home foreclosures adversely affect the borrower and his or her
surrounding community. Foreclosing on a property negatively impacts a
borrower's credit record and can hinder his or her access to and ability to
make certain transactions in the credit, educational, insurance, and other
markets. 126 A borrower may also suffer embarrassment and psychological
and emotional harm. 127 The external effects of home foreclosures inflict
serious social costs. If a substantial proportion of homes in a neighborhood
are lost to foreclosure and remain abandoned, this may contribute to blight
in the area.1 28 In areas that are already blighted, foreclosed properties can
remain vacant for a long time because the area becomes unattractive to
private consumers, and potential home purchasers and even realtors may
not be interested in purchasing or renovating homes in the community.129
This is especially significant in low-income areas where the community is
already deteriorating and revitalization projects may not exist. The
geographic concentration of foreclosed properties will have an adverse
impact on surrounding properties because even occupied residences may
experience a reduction in property value, and the community might not be
as marketable or might even become stigmatized.1 30 Nonetheless, the
actual number of loans affected by the devastating costs of subprime
lending is relatively low, although growing in most states, and some
economists predict that many borrowers will continue to pay off their loans
1' Id. at 315.
127

id.

1282004 Annual Roundtable Remarks, supra note 17; Silverman, supra note 68, at
523-24.
129ESSENE, supra note 3, at 2.
130

See id.; Tashman, supra note 6, at 413.
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1
as long as unemployment rates do not rise substantially. 13

Ill.

CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY

& BEHAVIOR FACILITATES

VULNERABILITY TO RISKS IN THE
SUBPRIME MARKET

The blame for the problems associated with subprime lending does
not fall on lenders or mortgage brokers alone, nor does it lie solely on the
loan terms, but sometimes consumers consciously and subconsciously
expose themselves to risks in the mortgage market. While it is evident that
some consumers are induced into subprime loans by no fault of their own,
others are criticized for negligently entering into terms they knew or should
have know they were unable to satisfy.1 32 A significant issue facing
consumers when deciding to take out a loan is whether they are adequately
informed, meaning that they are given all the information about a loan and
are counseled so that they understand its nature and terms, and whether
they are both willing and able to comparison shop for the most suitable loan
product and terms. 133
Some consumers recognize the risks involved with subprime loans
but decide to take their chances and gamble on the market in order to
achieve short-term benefits, for example access to capital or a home
purchase, without recognizing and understanding the consequences
associated with such risks. The emergence of the subprime market gives
consumers the freedom to borrow more than necessary or at an exorbitant
price, and some do so to their demise. 134 Particularly at risk are vulnerable
borrowers, especially those with lower incomes, who may be compelled to
obtain subprime loans, for new purchases or refinancing, in order to satisfy
existing debt, 135 and many borrowers do not understand the loan terms and
its associated risks or underestimate how much their interest rates can

131 See DOWNS, supra note 79.
132Christie,
133 Robert

supra note 70.

B. Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, Fed. Reserve Bulletin A73,

A77 (2007), availableal http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2007/

pdf/hmda06final.pdf
(This is the most recent government report analyzing the data ol lending practices and
loan performance collected pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act).
134ELMENDORF, supra note 93, at 10.
135 Silverman, supra note 68, at 509.
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increase, especially for ARMs. 136
Behavioral economics helps clarify why certain consumer behavior
makes borrowers more vulnerable to market risks. First, consumer
preferences for a particular product tend not to be fixed but can vary over
time and depending on how the product is marketed. 137 A consumer's
preference for a particular product may change depending on how the
lender "frames" his or her sales pitch or the benefit or uses of the product,
and because mortgage products are complex, sometimes "consumers are
unsure which product best meets their needs, or even whether they need the
product at all." 138 Second, due to the variations in loan features and the
lack of transparency in projected loan rates, consumers frequently are not
conscious of loan prices and the rate and extent to which it may change. 139
For example, some consumers erroneously believe that lenders are required
to offer the lowest interest rate possible and most favorable
loan terms,
0
whereas no such requirement currently exists under law.14
Third, it is often difficult for consumers to make choices that involve
substantial risks which must be thoroughly understood and choices that
have long term consequences and include payments over time.141 The
average consumer might not seek much information about the loan since
many do not buy or refinance a home often, and it may not seem worth it to
spend much time and energy learning about the market when there is no
expectation of transacting in it frequently. 42 Finally, even the most skillful
consumers find it difficult to shop for mortgages. 143 Mortgage loan options
can contain several complex provisions, and the realization of the risks and
benefits may often depend on projected analyses of future interest rate
fluctuations and other circumstances like whether a consumer will be able
to make his or her monthly payments on time in the next few years. 144 The
136 ELMENDORF,

supra note 93, at 10.

137 ESSENE, supra note 3, at 12-14.
138id.
39

1

Id. at 14-17.

140 See FED. RESERVE BANK O1 BOSTON, KNOW BEIFORE YOU GO...

MORTGAGE, available al http://www.bos.frb.org/consumer/knowbeforeyougo/

inortgage/mortgage.pdf.
141ESSENE, supra note 3, at 18-21.
142id.

143 Id. at 21-23.
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difficulty of weighing such options without the assistance of a professional

may lead consumers to a simpler analysis of balancing benefits and risks
associated with the loan that are expected in one to three years as opposed
to a more longitudinal risk management approach.
IV.

CERTAIN CONSUMER GROUPS ARE MORE VULNERABLE TO
SUBPRIME & ABUSIVE LENDING

While the risk of subprime lending impacts all consumers holding
such loans, borrowers of color and those residing in predominately nonHispanic white neighborhoods bear the heaviest burdens.
Low- to
moderate-income consumers are also a disproportionate share of subprime
borrowers, and the elderly, retirees, recent immigrants, and the less
educated are among those particularly affected. 145 Yet the latest data
collected under HMDA, the primary federal loan reporting regulation,
reveals little variance in loan pricing by gender. In 2006, female applicants
without a co-borrower were marginally less likely (30.9 percent) to receive
a high-priced loan for a home purchase than male applicants without a coborrower (32.3 percent). 146 Likewise, there was only a slight variance
between the home purchase loan denial rates for both female (20.9 percent)
and male borrowers (21.7 percent) without a co-signer. 147
Over thirty years ago one of the major financial issues facing
144See generally, John A. Weinberg, Borrowing by U.S. Households, 92 EcoN.
Q. 177 (2006).
145See Silverman, supra note 68, at 524, 527.
146 Avery et al., supra note 133, at A96, Table 11, A97 (little differences existed
both before and after controlling for factors related to individual borrowers and specific
lenders, and the total number of sole female (1,021,006) and male (1,392,947) borrowers
sampled for this data set was within a reasonable range). Note that the TIMDA data does
not account for whether the applicants were caretakers of children with whom they lived
or were otherwise the head of the household. Further research is needed to reveal
whether there are statistically significant loan differences for single mothers as opposed
to single fathers or even male non-father borrowers who obtained a loan without a cosigner. Also note that the HMDA data compiled by Avery et al. is limited in the sense
that it reflects information regarding only conventional first lien mortgages on one- to
four-family site-built homes that are the borrower's primary residence, as opposed to a
vacation home or secondary property. Raw lending data collected pursuant to HMDA
can be accessed online from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council at
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/.
141 Id. at A98, Table 13 (after controlling for factors related to individual
borrowers and specific lenders).
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consumers in neighborhoods of color was "redlining" - the practice of
"denying the extension of credit [within] certain geographic areas due to the
income, race, or ethnicity of its residents."14 Some report that real estate
brokers "allegedly dr[e]w red lines around districts where lenders would
refuse to make loans," 149 and banks also historically avoided establishing
branches in communities of color and declined to offer loans in these
neighborhoods. 150 Today, the issue is the alleged deliberate extension of
credit on unfair terms or the overextension of credit to consumers of color,
what some call "reverse redlining." 15 1 Redlining and reverse redlining, the
newer form of housing discrimination, are prohibited by federal civil rights
laws, including the Fair Housing Act (FHA). 152 In addition, a number of

predatory lending and redlining practices are prohibited by states and are
being incorporated into state civil rights laws. 153
Various studies reveal that even when controlling for income,
148

See United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203

n.5 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 21 (1993), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1905).
149 See GRAMIiCH, supra note 11, at 24; see also United Companies Lending
Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5 ("The term was derived from the actual practice of
drawing a red line around certain areas in which credit would be denied.").
150 Vikas Bajaj & Ford Fessenden, What's Behind the Race Gap, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2007, at 16 (referencing an analysis done by N.Y.U.'s Furman Center for Real
Estate and Urban Policy that illustrates subprime lending differences in New York City
neighborhoods) Manny Ferdandez & Ford Fessenden, Racial Disparity Found Among
New Yorkers With High-Rate Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at B1(referring to a
Federal Reserve study showing that "neighborhoods where people tend to have lower
credit scores also tend to [have] a greater concentration of high-cost loans.").
151 See United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 203
n.5 (defining
reverse redlining); Bajaj, supra note 150; Ferdandez, supra note 150.
152 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp.,
140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (asserting that redlining and reverse redlining
violates the FHA); Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (construing the FHA to prohibit discriminatory practices such as reverse
redlining, mortgage redlining, insurance redlining, racial steering and other practices
directly affecting the availability of housing to consumers of color).
153 See McGlawn v. Pa. Human Relations Comm., 891 A.2d
757 (Pa. Commw.
2006) (recognizing predatory lending and reverse redlining as prohibited acts under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, which is the state equivalent of the federal Civil
Rights Act, where the Commission found that mortgage broker and one of its principal
officers violated the Human Relations Act by discriminating against complainants in
mortgage loan transactions because of their race and the racial composition of their
communities), appeal denied, 906 A.2d 545 (Table) (2006).
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consumers in predominantly African-American areas are more likely to
have a subprime loan than borrowers in majority white areas, and in upperincome African-American communities, consumers are 1.5 times more
likely to have a subprime loan than borrowers in even low-income white
areas. 154 Consumers of color are also more likely to have higher priced
loans than their white counterparts.
HMDA data indicates that in 2006, African-American (53.7
percent), Hispanic white (46.6), and American Indian/Alaska Native (34.2)
mortgage applicants received a greater proportion of higher priced home
purchase loans that their non-Hispanic white counterparts (17.7). 155 After
controlling for factors relating to the individual borrowers and specific
lenders, the percentage point gap existing between these groups and nonHispanic whites was 12.6, 6.3, and 6.8 for African-Americans, Hispanic
whites, and American Indian/Alaska Natives respectively. 156 Notably,
Asians had a lower rate of receiving high priced home purchase loans than
non-Hispanic whites both before (16.8 percent) and after (16.8) controlling
for borrower and lender factors. 157 In addition, after controlling for
borrower and lender factors, the rate of mortgage loan denial for home
purchases was higher among African-Americans (21.5 percent), Hispanic
whites (17.5), and American Indian/Alaska Natives (18.2) applicants than
their non-Hispanic white counterparts (13.1). 158 However, the denial rates
among Asians (14.8) were slightly higher than that of non-Hispanic
whites. 159
The lending statistics regarding Boston and New York City are
particularly striking, though they do not amount to any conclusive evidence
of racial discrimination. In Boston, a study found that 55 percent of
African-American and Latino borrowers in the Boston metropolitan area
154See

Office of Fair Housing & Equal Opportunity, Subprine Lending, Dept of

Hous. and Urban Dev., availableat http://www.hud.gov/offices/tlieo/lending/
subprime.cfm (last visited Dec. 12, 2007); FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POLicy, DEMOGRAPHICS OF NEIGHBORHOODS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST RATES

01: SUBPRIME LENDING, N.Y. UNIV. (2007), availableat http://furmancenter.nyu.edu/

documents/AnalysisofNYCNeighborhoodswiththeHighestandLowestRatesofSubprimeLe
nding.pdf.
155 Avery et al., supra note 133, at A95-96, Table 11.
156

Td.

157

Id.

'58Id. at A98, Table 13.
159 id.
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had subprime loans for their single-family homes, while only 13 percent of
their white counterparts took out such loans. 160 Researchers at New York
University found that while the rate of subprime lending in New York City
(now 19.8 percent of all loans) and among communities of color decreased
slightly in 2006, African-American consumers (40.7 percent of all
subprime borrowers in 2006) were almost four times more likely to have a
subprime loan than white consumers (9.1 percent), and Hispanics were
almost three times more likely (28.6 percent). 161
The data suggest a correlation between race, space, and income. The
top ten areas in New York City with the greatest share of subprime loans
were populated predominately with people of color. For example, in
University Heights, where 47.2 percent of all loans were subprime loans,
African-Americans and Hispanics constituted 35 and 57.4 percent of the
population respectively; the median income was $22,000.162 In Jamaica,
where 46 percent of all loans were subprime, African-Americans and
Hispanics represented 76.5 and 13.7 of the population respectively, and the
median income was $45,000. 16

Whereas in the Upper East Side of

Manhattan, where only 0.6 percent of loans were subprime, whites were
84.7 percent of the population, and the median income was $74,000.164
Not only do borrowers in communities of color represent a
disproportionate share of subprime mortgage borrowers, but they along
with borrowers in rural communities are more likely to receive subprime
loans with prepayment penalties. Researchers at the Center for Responsible
Lending sampled 1.8 million loan originations in areas with defined

160 Kimberly Blanton, A

'Smoking Gun' on Race, Subprime Loans: Fresh

Evidence Shows Minorities in Boston More Likely Than Whites to Get Them When
Buying Home, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2007, at IC.

161Press Release, Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy N.Y. Univ., New
Housing Data Continue to Show Signs of Danger for New York City's Homeowners,
Furman Center Analysis Concludes (Oct. 15, 2007), available at

http://furmal-cel-ter.nyu.edu/documents/FurmanCel-ter-MDAAnalysis_000.pdf
(Asians were 13.6 percent of subprime borrowers in 2006. The study is partly based on
latest data released pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act under which lenders
must disclose certain lending information).
162 DEMOGRAPHICS

OF NEIGHBORHOODS

RATES OF SUBPRIME LENDING,
163Jd.
164id.
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concentrations of non-white residents from January 2000 to July 2004.161
After controlling for significant property, loan, and borrower characteristics
such as credit history, they found that borrowers living in zip code areas
with at least 50 percent of a non-white population were 35 times more
likely to receive prepayment penalties than similarity situated borrowers in
areas where non-whites comprised less than 10 percent of residents.166 In
areas with 25 to 49 percent of non-white residents, borrowers were 11.9
times more likely to receive prepayment penalties in their loan. 167
One study found that as compared with borrowers in cities,
borrowers in rural areas have a higher rate of receiving subprime loans with
prepayment penalty provisions lasting more than 36 or 60 months. 168 In
2002, compared to borrowers in the central cities of large metropolitan
areas, borrowers in rural areas were 5.5 percent more likely to receive loans
with prepayment penalties for a term of least 24 months, 8.6 percent more
likely for a term of 36 months, and 20.2 percent more likely for a term of
60 months.

169

The question as to why these patterns exist remains unanswered and
unproven. Some of the studies examining race in the mortgage industry are
inherently disadvantaged because they lack details about the applicant's
credit score, assets, down payments, and existing debt, 170 and federally
mandated loan reporting under HMDA does not account for all factors that
affect loan decisions, terms, and performance. 171
Some possible
165 Debbie

G. Bocian & Richard Zhai, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Borrowers

in Higher Minority Areas More Likely to Receive Prepayment Penalties on Subprime
Loans 1 (2005),
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr004PPP Minority Neighborhoods-0105.pdf.
166 Id. at 3, 6 (loans sampled were limited to those with penalty terms effective
for three or more years, and the study's result were statistically significant).
167 Id. at2.
168

John Farris & Christopher A. Richardson, The Geography of Subprime

Mortgage Prepayment Penally Patterns, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 687, 699 (2004),
available at http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/files/hpd / 2015(3)/hpd / 2015(3)
_article farris.pdf.
169 Id. at 709 (controlling for variables such as loan underwriting factors and type
of loan).
170 Ferdandez,

supra note 150.

17 Avery et al., supra note 133, at A94, A99. Note the data
collected under this
Act does not account for all loan originations in the country since depository intuitions
that originate loans and engage in refinancing are exempt from certain disclosure
requirements if the institution has $30 million or less in total assets as of their most recent
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explanations are: the historical lack of wealth and income among racial and
ethnic groups, the lack of preparedness of these groups to make a sufficient
down payment on their new home to secure a lower interest rate, the
tendency for many consumers in these groups to transact mainly with
mortgage companies providing only subprime loans rather than full-service
banks, the relative lack of banks in communities of color as compared to
predominantly white-non-Hispanic areas, and the lack of financial literacy
among communities of color. 172 Some argue that the disparity of highpriced loans among lower-income communities and those of color might be
economically justified, or at least further explained by the fact that blacks
as a group tend to be worse off financially, particularly in terms of
accumulated wealth, than whites. 173
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As asserted above, there is nothing inherently predatory or abusive
about subprime mortgage lending; however consumers need assistance in
navigating this market. Although some social and economic ills are curable
or at least alleviated by letting the market correct itself over time through
supply and demand fluctuations and other forces, the issues presented in the
subprime mortgage market cannot be addressed by a complete laissez-faire
approach. While the ideals of a free market economy, including the
freedom to contract into loan terms, are noteworthy and apt in some
contexts, reform in the subprime prime market needs a slightly more active
solution. Borrowers should learn how to navigate the market and seek help
doing so, lenders and affiliated brokers should adopt best practices
consistent with and above and beyond applicable legal standards, and the
federal and state government should impose heightened yet reasonable
oversight and accountability measures. Any response to curtailing the costs
and problems associated with subprime lending must balance: (1) the desire
for this market to operate effectively so consumers with a poor credit
history or who are otherwise ineligible for large loans can still access credit
fiscal year. 12 U.S.C. § 2803(i) (exemption from itemized disclosures of the "number and
dollar amount of mortgage loans and completed applications involving mortgagors or
mortgage applicants grouped according to census tract, income level, racial
characteristics, and gender"). Thus many smaller lenders are not required to report some
of the information that might reveal or explain some of the variance in loan terms and
performance among and between certain consumer groups.
172See Bajaj, supra note 150; Ferdandez, supra note 150.
173See
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with (2) the need to prevent lenders from preying on vulnerable borrowers,
and with (3) the need to hold consumers responsible for their own
decisions.
A. Consumer-OrientedSolutions
Among the most viable solutions for consumers are: offering and
encouraging mortgage counseling, increasing financial literacy, and
encouraging consumers to resist the temptation to make home purchases
above their means or to enter loans without carefully analyzing the risks
involved. Public and private groups in several states already have some
form of mortgage counseling, but considering the escalating risks in the
current subprime mortgage market, this service should be promoted more,
especially in communities where consumers are particularly vulnerable.
Disinterested, third-party mortgage counselors should be specially trained
or knowledgeable about the mortgage industry so they can help consumers
navigate the complex mortgage market and choose the best loan option
suitable to their income and assets even if it means not obtaining a
subprime loan. Counselors should be available in all major cities, and some
should particularly target borrowers of color and those in less densely
populated areas.
This counseling should also be available via a telephone hotline so
consumers can get real-time advice tailored to their needs; this also helps
consumers like the elderly who may not be able to travel to the counseling
centers or do not know how to use the internet to seek information about
mortgages. For the computer savvy, an online mortgage program might be
created to not only disseminate information about particular loan products,
but also to calculate and estimate loan prices and expected interest rate
adjustments based on consumer inputted data. 174 As the calculation and
risk assessment for mortgage products can be very complex, a limitation of
the system is that it is difficult to predict a loan's performance for
individual borrowers due to several factors that can influence the
probability of default and assessment of late fees caused by a reduction in
income, loss or incapacitation of a spouse or someone else providing
financial support, or sudden medical and other significant expenses.
However this program would allow consumers to obtain a rough estimate
of how much their loan may cost over a certain period of time and with a
certain loan product.
174

See

ESSENE, supra note 3, at 37 (recommending an interactive online

mortgage counseling service like the real time travel information available on websites
such as www.orbitz.com and www.expedia.com).
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The role of providing these services should be assumed by both
community and non-profit groups and the government. Community-based
organizations (CBOs) can serve a critical role in helping consumers transact
in the mortgage market. Housing-oriented CBOs may be described as
"nonprofit providers of housing services, [homeownership] counseling, and
foreclosure protection," and can help consumers identify and evaluate
mortgage options and even secure alternative funds to help borrowers avoid
being locked into non-favorable loan terms. 175 Community development
corporations (CDCs) were some of the first entities serving these functions,
and are non-financial organizations that among other things renovate
residences, locate lower income prospective homeowners, and help them
finance their mortgage with reputable lending institutions; some of these
organizations qualify for federal funding. 176
Newer organizations are community development financial
institutions (CDFls), which are charted by the U.S. Treasury Department
and aim to stimulate economic revitalization and community development
in underserved populations. 177 Similar to CDCs, CDFIs provide a broad
array of social services, but unlike CDCs, these organizations are financial
entities that receive federal and private funds and financial services to assist
low-income communities, and they offer nontraditional mortgages and
loans along with extending credit to eligible consumers. 178 Although this
program helps consumers navigate the mortgage market, the budget for the
CDFI Fund, a financing program administered by the Treasury Department
and the largest funding source for CDFIs, has been cut in half since
2001.179 Thus backing from the non-profit sector can also help ameliorate
problems and risks consumers face in the subprime mortgage market.
Organizations like the American Association of Retired Persons and
Habitat for Humanity which service vulnerable groups like the elderly and
low-income persons should offer literature and counseling support for
potential borrowers, or at least refer them to appropriate resources. Megachurches, especially the African-American church, whose members are
175GRAMLICH,

supra note 11, at 30-32.

"'6-Id. at 30.
177

CDFI

Fund

About
the
CDFI
Fund,
U.S.
Treasury,
http://www.cdfifund.gov/who we are/about us.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
178GRAMLICH, supra note 11, at 30-3 1; Coalition of Community Development
-

Financial Institutions, http://www.cdfi.org/cdfi-info-le.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
179 COALITION OF COMMUNITY DEvE1.OPMENT FINANCIAl

FACT SHEET, http://www.cdfi.org/downloads/CDFI FactSheet.pdf.
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particularly vulnerable to subprime lending, should take an active role in
hiring or soliciting volunteer counselors for their parishioners, promoting
responsible credit habits, and encouraging members to seek some type of
credit or mortgage counseling. These churches tend to have the same
amount or even more resources than community-based and local
government entities, and many also utilize their tax-exempt status to secure
critical govermnent support through faith-based initiative funding.
For example, former U.S. Congressman Floyd H. Flake pastors the
over 18,000 member Greater Allen Cathedral of New York which offers
regular consumer finance and mortgage counseling to the predominantly
African-American congregation. 180 Pastor Flake uses his political acumen
and role model status in the community to obtain private and government
funding, and his church offers a wide array of social welfare services.
Abyssinian Baptist Church, 181 one of the most historical African-American
churches dating back to 1808, created the Abyssinian Development
Corporation 182 which among other things develops rental housing and
homeownership opportunities for the residents of Central Harlem, New
York.
Yet, a majority of CBOs are constrained by limited staff and
funding; therefore government assistance is needed and should be
employed to strengthen consumer protection.
In addition to the
continuance of government-sponsored housing programs, the budget
appropriations for organizations such as CDFIs should be increased to a
level that allows these programs to expand and strengthen their services to
communities in need.
In Iowa, for example, Attorney General Tom Miller implemented a
pilot mortgage assistance program and hired a local mediation service to
180 The church, located in Jamaica, New York, is considered by many to be the

model of faith-based community initiatives. The church also constructed a $42 million
senior citizen assisted living complex of 330 units and is currently building a commercial
retail space with low-income housing units on top. Information on these and other Allen
projects is available through the church's website. Greater Allen Cathedral of New York,
littp://allencathedral.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
181Pastor Calvin 0. Butts, III led the church in funding a $2.8 million program to
acquire and renovate 26 apartment units for the homeless across the street fiom the
church, helping to constructing a $9 million senior citizens apartment building of 100
units, and renovating moderate income condominiums in conjunction with the New York
City Partnership. The church is located in Harlem, New York. The Abyssinian Baptist
Church, http://www.abvssinian.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
182 Abyssinian Development Corporation, http://www.adcorp.org (last visited
Feb. 19, 2008).
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establish a toll-free mortgage counseling hotline; this organization has
already received over 4,000 calls and is working on about 520 mortgage
cases.183 President Bush recently announced a joint consumer protection
initiative, the "HOPE NOW Alliance," with the Treasury Department and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that includes
offering a toll-free 24-hour mortgage counseling hotline (1-888-995HOPE) in multiple languages. 184 This organization pools members from
the private sector to implement mortgage relief and counseling programs
185
and claims to do so without taxpayer subsidies or government mandates.
The Bush Administration also aims to temporarily freeze interest rates for
troubled borrowers, especially those with subprime ARMs. 186 However the
Alliance is receiving much criticism as commentators contend that the Bush
Administration is not doing everything it claims, that the hotline often
merely instructs people to contact their lender, that the program helps only
a portion of borrowers in serious delinquency or facing imminent
foreclosure, and that the program's short-term benefits do little to help
borrowers with longstanding problems and a history of poor credit; some
suggest that the government should rather be working to inform consumers
about various loan options. 97
The drawback with a consumer counseling approach is that it
assumes consumers will have not only the initiative but the time and means
183 Press

Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Iowa Dep't of Justice, New Iowa

"Foreclosure
Hotline"
-- 877-622-4866
(Sept.
11,
2007),
available at
http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest news/releases/sept 2007/Foreclosure -Hotlin
e.html); Vikas Bajaj, How to Solve a Subprime Mess? An Iowan Says, Let's Caucus, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, at 31.
184 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, President Bush
Announces Private-Sector Plan To Help Struggling Homeowners, Calls On Congress To
Join Administration In Acting (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Pres. Bush's Homeownership
Initiative], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/200712067.htm 1.
185Id.Note that since this initiative was recently implemented and the Bush
Administration has yet to publicly release complete data about its performance, some of
its aspirations and achievements are currently unconfirmed.
186Renae Merle, Foreclosures. Lenders' PrefrrredFix, WASI. POST, Jan. 18,
2008, at DOI.
117See, e.g., Editorial, Default Position, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at 24:
Editorial, Hope Later, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 2008, at A20 (discussing the White House's
inadequate measures to address the mortgage crisis); Editorial, Li/ine/br Whom?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A24; Merle, supra note 186 (describing consumer advocates'
criticism of the shortcomings of the Bush administration's plan).
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to seek such services. Even with the Bush Administration's new initiative
and existing counseling programs, some consumers do not respond when
they are contacted by these organizations or do not attend the programs.188
Yet the policy balance for consumer responsibility should put the onus on
borrowers to seek help to the best extent possible, and those completely
unwilling to help themselves should be prepared to face the risks. This
approach also requires the costly hiring or volunteering of counselors, and
it necessitates uniformity in and accountability for the disseminated
information.
Another limitation with this approach is that very few states, mainly
North Carolina and New York, require or statutorily recommend mortgage
counseling for risky mortgage loans, and there is currently no federal law
mandating counseling for all risky mortgage products. For example, North
Carolina requires borrowers seeking a statutorily defined "high-cost home
loan" to receive mortgage counseling from a state approved counselor, and
lenders must receive confirmation that borrowers received the
counseling. 8 9 New York law requires only that before originating a high
cost home loan, lenders and brokers recommend in writing that borrowers
"consider financial counseling" and provide them with a list of state
1 90
approved counselors.
One recommendation would be to urge all states to adopt legislation
requiring some form of mortgage counseling for borrowers seeking high
risk mortgage loans. The criteria for this mandate should be narrowly
tailored as to not put an undue burden on too many consumers but
expansive enough to ensure adequate consumer protection. Whether
counseling is required should be based on some combination of at least the
following four factors: (1) the level of risk associated with the loan, defined
similarly to the North Carolina high-cost home loan statute,191 (2) the
consumer's debt-to-income ratio so that persons whose outstanding debt
plus that to be incurred by the mortgage loan far exceeds their income (by
188 See
189

Merle, supra note 186.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 E(c)(1) (2007); § 24-1.1 E(a)(4) (defining a high-cost

home loan). The law also imposes other limitations on both lenders and brokers regarding
high-cost home loans. § 24-1.lE(b) (setting limits on terms such as balloon payments and
increased interest rates). If a mortgage broker brokers a high-cost home loan where the
borrower was required to but did not receive counseling, the broker is jointly and
severally liable. See § 24-1.IE(g) (liability for brokers for brokering loans that violate the
limitation provisions and specified prohibitions).
190N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 41.3(a) (2006).
191N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.I E(a)(4), (6).
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more than approximately 3.5 times) should be more likely to fall under this
requirement, (3) the expected loan-to-value ratio with the prospective
mortgage product so that the requirement is triggered if the loan amount far
exceeds the value or projected value of the home, and (4) some measure of
the borrower's current and projected income or other assets as evidence of
an ability to repay the loan.
Like the North Carolina statute, lenders should have to receive
notification that a prospective borrower fulfilled the counseling requirement
before a risky loan can be originated. Although riskier subprime loans tend
to be originated for borrowers in communities of color, this legislation
should not enforce any mandates on residents of these areas by virtue of
their residency alone.
If so, the statutes might be construed as
discriminatory on its face or in its application. 192 This proposal would also
require an appropriations bill for a substantial amount of funding to finance
the creation or strengthening of state approved mortgage counseling in
areas where none existed or operated inefficiently. Even with this proposal,
the costs of compliance is high for some prospective borrowers, especially
lower-income consumers, who may face a tough dilemma choosing
whether to work extra hours to provide for their family or to spend that time
attending a mortgage class.
Financial literacy and public awareness programs can also help
consumers gain information about the mortgage industry. The government
should continue to offer literature and other homeownership information
through HUD and distribute it to CBOs and churches so they can
disseminate it to borrowers in their area. Banks should also have their own
or government-produced materials available for consumers on-site and free
of change. The Bush Administration reports that the HOPE NOW Alliance
recently mailed notification letters to hundreds of thousands of borrowers
who fell behind their mortgage payments. 193 Some criticize this approach
citing that it will lead to information overload, that less educated borrowers
may not understand the material, and that consumers will need to receive
this information so far in advance of a obtaining a mortgage loan and will

192For example, if the application of the statute required all residents of County
X, a predominately Hispanic area, to have counseling, and residents of County Y, a
predominately white area, were not required to attend counseling (regardless of the
lending and income records of both geographic areas), the law might be interpreted as
discriminating against all Hispanics, or arguably against whites, or the residency trigger
might be construed as a proxy for race.
193Pres. Bush's Homeownership Initiative, supra note 184.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol11/iss2/2

2007-20081

CA VEAT EMPTOR

not benefit if the information is not released timely. 194 While borrowers,
especially the more vulnerable, inherently have less bargaining power in
mortgage transactions. these measures can help consumers navigate the
mortgage market.
Whether specially tailored initiatives, besides regulating and holding
lenders accountable, are needed to address the racial disparities in the
subprime mortgage market is a more difficult issue. The available data is
does not isolate the causes of this disparity and is complicate by the fact
that subprime lending might also help consumers of color make their first
home purchase or otherwise gain access to credit. 195 A feasible approach,
like the aforementioned recommendations, must center on the consumers
but also apply reasonable, but not excessive oversight and accountability
for lenders and brokers.
To this end, mortgage counseling and financial literacy and public
awareness programs should place particular emphasis on communities of
color. Local residents and the government should also appeal to and put
pressure on banks to establish more branches in these neighborhoods, even
if the legislature passes non-binding resolutions expressing the sense of
Congress and the Senate that banks should some bear some social
responsibility for offering financial products in diverse areas. However,
besides discrimination, one of the reasons banks traditionally avoided these
communities still exists - banks in many of these areas may not be as
profitable since local consumers tend not to have as much income and
wealth to invest in the bank and may have a questionable ability to repay a
bank loan, and there tends to be a lack of local high-end business
consumers to use the bank for corporate ends. Finally, although the
subprime mortgage market can help many borrowers, some consumers,
especially the most vulnerable and those aware of their inability to maintain
a loan obligation, should not obtain a subprime loan even if it means
forbearing an opportunity to achieve the American Dream with a first home
purchase. Inevitably, initiatives will have to empower consumers to make
the best informed choices and teach them responsible financial
management.
B. Lender-OrientedSolutions
194See

Silverman, supra note 68, at 569-70.
195 See discussion and notes accompanying Part 11.A (homeownership rates
among consumers of color) and Part IV (subprime mortgage lending among consumers of
color).
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No policy solution can effectively address the risks consumers face
in the subprime market by putting the burden on consumers alone. The
subprime mortgage market needs government oversight, and lenders and
brokers should be held civilly accountable through fines, mandatory
financial contributions to consumer education programs, and other
penalties. However, any reform in the subprime mortgage market must
strike an adequate public policy balance. An unleashed activist state with
too much regulation might overburden the market because lenders may be
wary about originating subprime loans due to increased exposure to
liability, and as a result fewer consumers in need may be extended credit.
Lenders and their affiliated organizations should work to adopt
standard best practices for originating subprime loans.
While the
legislature is apt for setting and enforcing lending standards, organizations
such as the National Association of Mortgage Brokers and the governmentsponsored enterprises, mainly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, should
promote a higher standard of best practices. In fact in some cases the best
practices should be above and beyond statutory obligations since future
laws might not reach that far into the industry due to policy concerns.
State laws should mandate heightened underwriting standards for
originating subprime mortgage loans. Lenders and brokers should be
required to thoroughly assess a consumer's ability to repay a subprime loan
within a reasonable amount of time; such underwriting should include
examining credit scores, current and projected income, and debt-to-income
ratios. Consumers should also be required to submit income verification
when submitting an application for a subprime mortgage loan. State law
should impose a reasonable duty of care that lenders, brokers, and their
agents owe to consumers, and also require lenders and brokers to be trained
on their duties and lending responsibilities, including the application of,
obligations, prohibitions, and potential liability under the federal Fair
Housing Act 196 or the equivalent state housing and civil rights laws.
Lenders and brokers should enter every mortgage transaction understanding
their duty to consumers and that their actions may subject them to
individual liability, judicial sanctions, and/or administrative sanctions.
As a best practice, lenders and brokers should implement a
monitoring system to track all loan originations and their performance with
complete consumer data, including race, gender, geographic area, and
income and debt levels. This data should be systematically compiled and
19642 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.
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reviewed, at least on a biannual basis, by senior management of the
institution. Examiners should look for any material patterns of price
discrimination, including unfavorable loan terms, steering certain
consumers into the subprime market, and other practices directly affecting
the availability of credit to consumers of color. If these material results are
unjustifiable by the borrower's underlying credit risk or are otherwise
unexplainable by the lender or broker, one or more of the following actions
should be taken to the extent necessary: issuing a private warning to the
employee and a public notice of questionable lending practices in the
workplace, reducing the lenders pay or the broker's commission, or
suspending or terminating that employee to the extent allowable under any
existing employment agreement. Finally, lenders and brokers should be
required by law to report all lending data to the appropriate federal agency,
and these results should be included in the HMDA reports.
VI. CONCLUSION

The U.S. subprime mortgage market offers credit to thousands of
borrowers who otherwise are unable to obtain a large loan due to poor or
little credit and other financial crisis. The emergence of subprime lending
in the early 1900s now serves a legitimate role in the nation's economy and
social structure, enabling borrowers to gain access to credit and home
mortgage loans. Yet, these benefits come at a cost; subprime loans are
inherently risky, some lenders engage in abusive and predatory practices,
and subprime borrowers have a greater chance of incurring excessive
mortgage debt, defaulting on their loans, and facing foreclosure.
While the subprime mortgage market is not inherently abusive or
predatory, many unscrupulous lenders and brokers take advantage of
consumers. Consumer behavior and demographics make some borrowers
more vulnerable to these risks, and responses to alleviate the risks
consumers face in this market must empower them to make the best
informed choices. Furthermore, any policy initiative aimed at eliminating
unfair and abusive lending practices must balance the desire for this market
to operate efficiently with the need to prevent lenders from preying on
vulnerable borrowers and the need to hold consumers responsible for their
own decisions.
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